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Abstract: Over the last 50 years, advances in technology have led to an increase in the
complexity and sophistication of systems. More complex systems can be harder to maintain
and the root cause of a fault more difficult to isolate.
Downtime resultin from a system failure can be dangerous or expensive, depending on the
type of system. In aircraft systems the ability to diagnose quickly the causes of a fault can
have a significant impact on the time taken to rectify the problem and to return the aircraft
to service. In chemical prcess plants the need to diagnose causes of a safety-critical failure in
a system can be vital and a diagnosis may be required within minutes. Speed of fault
isolation can save time, reduce costs, and increase company productivity and therefore
profits. System fault diagnosis is the process of identifying the cause of a malfunction by
observing its effect at various test points.
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a method that describes all possible causes of a specified system
state in terms of the state of the components within the system. A system model is used to
identify the states that the system should be in at any point in time. This paper presents a
method for diagnosing faults in systems using FTA to explain the deviations from normal
operation observed in sensor outputs. The causes of a system’s failure modes will be
described in terms of the component states. This will be achieved with the use of coherent
and non-coherent fault trees. A coherent fault tree is constructed from AND and OR logic
and therefore considers only component-failed states. The non-coherent method expands
this, allowing the use of NOT logic, which implies that the existence of component-failed
states and component-working states are both taken into account. This paper illustrates the
concepts of this method by applying the technique to a simplified water tank level control
system.
Keywords: fault diagnosis, fault tree analysis
1 INTRODUCTION
A system can be analysed for faults in two diff-
erent ways. The first is to test the system functional-
ity at one point in time. The second continuously
monitors the system and detects faults as they occur.
An example of an approach that carries out a
series of tests to determine the system status at
one point in time is the sequential fault diagnostic
tool developed by Novak and co-workers [1–4].
The approach uses information about which
symptoms are exhibited when the faults are
present. The sequential fault diagnostic tool deter-
mines the best sequence to conduct the test to
locate the fault condition in the cheapest (or
quickest) way. A similar method by Pattipati and
Alexandridis [5] uses heuristic algorithms in order
to determine the most cost-effective sequence of
tests. These methods are limited to situations where
only a single fault is expected to exist at any point in
time; they do not take into consideration multiple
component failures. Shakeri et al. [6] extended
sequential test sequencing to diagnose multiple
failures in systems. However, this method takes
a considerable length of time to obtain a diagnosis.
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Another approach to diagnosis is the use of gra-
phical models to describe the propagation of faults
in systems. Rao [7] developed two algorithms that
use the information from directed graphs of systems
to diagnose single failures at one point in time. This
technique was developed further by Pattipati [8] to
diagnose multiple failures in systems. This graphical
method, however, does not take into consideration
faults that do not immediately affect the status of
the system when they occur.
Failure modes effects analysis (FMEA) is a struc-
tured qualitative analysis of a system, subsystem, or
function that can be used to identify potential sys-
tem failure modes, their causes, and the effects on
the system operation associated with the failure
modes occurrence. Price [9] demonstrated the use
of automated FMEA to generate reports that could
be used in a diagnostic tool to diagnose multiple
faults in systems at one point in time. The failures
from the FMEA are only generated to a chosen likeli-
hood of occurrence; therefore all possible outcomes
of failure for a system scenario may not be obtained.
Paasch and Mocko [10] use FMEA and fault tree
analysis (FTA) to develop a model that uses matrix
manipulation for diagnosing faults in systems at
one point in time. This research does not, however,
consider multiple failures.
Papadopoulos [11] has carried out work using
state charts and fault trees to provide continuous
on-line monitoring and rectification of systems.
NOT logic is excluded from the fault trees; therefore
only component failures are taken into account to
obtain diagnosis. As a result, some faults occurring
simultaneously have required conflicting remedial
procedures. Yangping et al. [12] also developed a
fault-tree-based method that considers only compo-
nent failures, which uses genetic algorithms to
monitor continuously for faults in nuclear power
plants. Genetic search is slow in obtaining solutions
and there can be problems determining when a
global rather than a local diagnosis has been
obtained.
Many system failures are not usually the result
of one single fault. Therefore the ability to diagnose
multiple faults is vitally important. Methods of
finding faults or combinations of faults as they occur
are the subject of this paper. The approach is
based on the fault tree method [13–15]. This is tradi-
tionally used to quantify the likelihood of a system
failure. In this application the logic diagram is used
to develop causes of a system symptom exhibited
by a sensor reading, in terms of component
conditions. In order to illustrate the features of
the method described in this paper it will be
applied to a simplified water tank level control
system.
2 THE WATER TANK SYSTEM
The water tank system is illustrated in Fig. 1. It aims
to maintain the level of water between two predeter-
mined limits. In normal operational mode, water
flows out of the system through valve V2. The level
control system determines when water is flowing
from the tank and then refills it by opening valve
V1 until the desired tank level is reached. The over-
spill tray located beneath the tank catches water if
Main
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Fig. 1 Water tank system
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the tank has ruptured, if water has leaked out
through a crack or hole, or if the water level over-
flows from the top.
2.1 System component description
The water tank system shown in Fig. 1 consists of
three valves labelled V1, V2, and V3, two level sensors
represented by S1 and S2, two controllers C1 and C2,
and an overspill tray labelled TRAY. There are six
sections of pipes identified by the labels P1 to P6.
V1 is an air-to-open (A/O) inlet valve controlled by
C1. The level sensor S1 detects the height of the
water in the tank. In normal operating mode, if the
water in the tank falls below the required level (as
indicated by the sensor S1), the controller C1 would
open valve V1, allowing water into the tank. Conver-
sely, if the water in the tank rises to the required
level, then C1 will close V1.
V2 is a manual (MAN) valve, controlled by an
operator in response to demand. Finally valve V3 is
an air-to-close (A/C) valve that operates as a safety
valve controlled by C2. Normally this will only
become operational when a component failure
occurs which causes a very high level of water in
the tank. A signal from S2 would cause the controller
C2 to open valve V3 to reduce the level of water in
the tank.
The overspill tray, located underneath the tank,
collects any spillages that may occur owing to a fail-
ure in the system. So, water in the overspill tray will
occur if the tank has ruptured, if the tank is leaking,
or if the water level overflows from the top of
the tank.
2.2 System operating modes
2.2.1 Sensor locations
The status of the system is determined using mea-
surements provided by flow sensors situated next
to each of the three valves in the system. The sensors
are denoted by VF1, VF2, and VF3 for locations at V1,
V2, and V3 respectively. These each detect the pre-
sence or absence of flow of water, which can be
denoted as flow F or no flow NF respectively. For
this demonstration study it is assumed the sensors
are perfectly reliable. A fourth sensor denoted by
SP1 is located in the overspill tray to indicate
whether any water has escaped from the tank. Its
reading is interpreted as water W or no water NW.
The sensor locations described above are called the
system observation points. The observation points
for V1, V2, V3, and TRAY generated 16 different sce-
narios that the system potentially could produce.
These are listed in Table 1.
Were this a real system, additional sensors could
be added in order to provide a more complete
picture of its operating state. The level control sen-
sors S1 and S2 could also be used. However for the
purposes of demonstrating the fault-tree-based
fault diagnostics technique the system sensors as
described are sufficient, without any additional
complexity.
The system has two operating modes; these being
ACTIVE when the operator opens valve V2, or
DORMANT when V2 is closed. In the ACTIVE operat-
ing mode, water is taken out of the system through
valve V2 and the tank is refilled by water coming in
through valve V1 from the main water supply. Water
would not exit the system through valve V3 and there
would be no water in the overspill tray. The sensor
readings for the system when ACTIVE should be as
those given in scenario 4 in Table 1. In the DOR-
MANT operating mode the system is effectively on
standby with all three valves remaining closed and
the overspill tray empty. This should result in the
sensor readings given in scenario 16 in Table 1.
The sensor readings given by scenarios 4 and 16
are those which, under steady state conditions,
represent the model of how the system should
behave when ACTIVE and DORMANT respectively.
Given that the system is in the ACTIVE or DORMANT
state, any sensor readings that deviate from those
expected are regarded as being indicative of some
fault within the system.
2.2.2 Possible component failures
In order to apply FTA to a system the faults that
could occur for each of the system components
need to be defined. Table 2 contains a list of possible
component failures and their code.
The two operating modes are also represented in
the fault trees. ACTIVE signifies that the operator
has attempted to open valve V2. DORMANT is used
Table 1 System scenarios
Scenario V1 V2 V3 TRAY
1 F F F W
2 F F F NW
3 F F NF W
4 F F NF NW
5 F NF F W
6 F NF F NW
7 F NF NF W
8 F NF NF NW
9 NF F F W
10 NF F F NW
11 NF F NF W
12 NF F NF NW
13 NF NF F W
14 NF NF F NW
15 NF NF NF W
16 NF NF NF NW
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to indicate that the operator has tried to close V2. It
should be noted that this is a two-mode system and
so only one of the variables ACTIVE or DORMANT
can be true at any time.
3 SENSOR DEVIATION MODELS
In the application of FTA to the system fault diagnos-
tics a series of failure logic diagrams are produced,
representing the causes of any sensor readings.
These are developed in a fault tree in terms of the
component failure conditions of the system operat-
ing state. The list of all possible sensor readings for
the system is shown in Table 3.
Two other possible sensor readings for the system
are ‘no flow through valve V3’ and ‘no water in the
overspill tray’. However, these sensor readings
would occur under normal operational conditions
(i.e. without any failures occurring) in both the
ACTIVE and the DORMANT operating states.
3.1 Fault tree construction
Fault trees were generated for each sensor reading
listed in Table 3 using both coherent and non-coher-
ent methods. Coherent fault trees are constructed
from AND and OR logic and feature only component
failure events in the causes of sensor status. The
non-coherent method expands this, allowing the
use of the NOT operator. This implies that both com-
ponent-failed and component-working states are
taken into account when developing the causes of
the sensor status.
3.1.1 Coherent fault tree for the sensor reading flow
through valve V2
The coherent fault tree for the sensor reading ‘flow
through valve V2’ is presented in Fig. 2. Referring to
Fig. 1, ‘flow through valve V2’ can only occur
because V2 is open. There are two possibilities for
having V2 open, these being that either the valve
has failed open, which is a basic event, or that
the system is in a flow phase and is therefore in the
ACTIVE operating mode, represented by a house
event. The two prospective outcomes terminate
the logic development; in this instance the fault
tree is small.
3.1.2 Non-coherent fault tree for the sensor
reading flow through valve V2
The non-coherent fault tree for the sensor reading
‘flow through valve V2’ is shown in Figs 3(a) to (c).
The information described by the coherent fault
tree in section 3.1.1 can now be expanded to include
everything in the system that is known not to have
failed. Figures 3(a) to (c) show that the introduction
of NOT logic significantly increases the amount of
information known about the system behaviour.
The sensor reading ‘flow through valve V2’ occurs
because V2 is open and also because there is water
available. As in the coherent fault tree, V2 is open
either because it has failed open or because it is in
a flow phase (therefore it is in the ACTIVE operating
mode). If V2 is open, then it is definitely not closed.
Therefore it cannot have failed closed or be in a no-
flow (DORMANT) phase.
Table 2 Potential component failures
Code Component failure
PiB (1 6 i 6 6) Pipe Pi is blocked
PiF (1 6 i 6 6) Pipe Pi is fractured
ViFC (1 6 i 6 3) Valve Vi fails closed
ViFO (1 6 i 6 3) Valve Vi fails open
SiFH (1 6 i 6 2) Sensor Si fails high
SiFL (1 6 i 6 2) Sensor Si fails low
CiFH (1 6 i 6 2) Controller Ci fails high
CiFL (1 6 i 6 2) Controller Ci fails low
TR Water tank ruptured
TL Water tank leaks
NWMS No water from main supply
Fig. 2 Coherent fault tree for the sensor reading flow
through valve V2
Table 3 Sensor readings
Abbreviation Sensor reading
FTV1 Flow through valve V1
FTV2 Flow through valve V2
FTV3 Flow through valve V3
NFTV1 No flow through valve V1
NFTV2 No flow through valve V2
WOST Water in the overspill tray
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As well as the valve being open, water has to be
available at valve V2 in order to obtain flow. There-
fore water can pass through pipes P3 and P4, indicat-
ing that P3 is not blocked or fractured and P4 is not
blocked. Water also must be available to pass from
the tank to pipe P3. Therefore water is contained in
the tank, indicating that it has not ruptured, and
water is being supplied to the tank, indicating that
pipes P1 and P2 are clear and water is coming into
the tank. Therefore water is available from the main
supply and water can be passed through valve V1.
These non-failures together with the potential
causes of water through V2 can be combined using
an AND gate to form the non-coherent fault tree for
the sensor reading.
3.2 System fault detection
The system was modelled by four different schemes,
of different complexities, in order to construct the
scenarios generated from the system observation
points (see Table 1). It has been assumed throughout
that the system was in a steady state operating con-
dition. Dynamic considerations are also discussed
later (see section 4.5).
3.2.1 Scheme 1
In this scheme, coherent fault trees were used to
develop causes of sensor deviations. At any given
time the sensors must indicate one of the 16 scenar-
ios listed in Table 1. If the system is ACTIVE, the
sensors should show the readings as in scenario 4
of Table 1. In the DORMANT state they should
show the readings in scenario 16. When the actual
readings do not match the pattern of the model, it
suggests that a fault exists in at least one of the sys-
tem components. To find all possible causes, a top
event structure can be constructed from the infor-
mation given by the system observation points. In
this scheme, only the observation points giving sen-
sor readings that deviate from the normal operating
mode of the system are considered. For a given set
of sensor readings the causes of the scenario are
developed as fault trees. These are constructed by
combining the causes of sensor readings which devi-
ate from that expected using an AND gate. This
scheme is now demonstrated assuming that the sys-
tem is ACTIVE and that the sensor readings from
scenario 1 from Table 1 are obtained.
Table 4 contains sensor readings expected when
the system is in the ACTIVE operating mode (sce-
nario 4) and the actual reading scenario 1. The table
shows that the sensor reading for valve V3 is ‘flow’,
when in the ACTIVE operating mode it should be
‘no flow’. Also the sensor SP1 in the overspill tray
should read ‘no water’ but it is indicating that there
is water present. Therefore these sensors show that
in scenario 1 there are two sensors that have
deviated from their expected readings in the normal
operating mode.
In scheme 1, coherent fault trees for the deviated
sensor readings are combined as inputs to an AND
gate to form the scenario’s top event structure. This
is shown in Fig. 4.
A qualitative analysis of this fault tree will produce
its minimal cut sets. These are a list of all the combi-
nations of component failures that would cause the
sensor readings obtained. Analysis of the fault tree
structure given in Fig. 4 produces in total 102 poten-
tial causes. From closer inspection, however, only 15
of these will produce the top event structure. The
remaining 87 are incorrect; the causes of this are dis-
cussed below. The 15 valid potential causes are listed
in Table 5.
The coherent fault trees for the sensor readings
‘flow through valve V3’ and ‘water in the overspill
(a)
Fig. 3 Non-coherent fault tree for the sensor reading
(a) flow through valve V2, (b) flow through valve
V2, transfer 1, and (c) flow through valve V2,
transfer 2
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tray’ are both valid when analysed individually.
However, one of the reasons for obtaining ‘water
in the overspill tray’ is that no flow through valve
V3 occurs, contradicting the sensor reading ‘flow
through valve V3’. With no NOT logic present
in the fault trees to indicate the component work-
ing states, conflicting potential causes are not
removed. For example, one of the incorrect mini-
mal cut sets is V1FO.P3B.P5B. This minimal
cut set would give water in the overspill tray;
however, pipe P5 is blocked and so water cannot
get through V3, contradicting the top event struc-
ture. Therefore coherent fault trees do not contain
sufficient information about system behaviour,
(b)
Fig. 3 (Continued)
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implying that scheme 1 is not a very reliable
method.
As well as the problem of invalid potential causes
the number of valid potential causes of scenario 1
listed above is quite large. Therefore it would be dif-
ficult to determine which could be the actual cause.
Scheme 1 does not take into account the sensor
readings from the observation points in the scenario
(c)
Fig. 3 (Continued)
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that are correct for the chosen operating mode. Only
the first three potential causes actually produce sce-
nario 1 when the sensor readings from the observa-
tion points at valves V1 and V2 are taken into
account. The other potential causes are all valid for
the sensor reading flow through V1 but would result
in no flow through valve V2. This issue is addressed
in scheme 2 where information from the sensors
that are operating correctly is used to evaluate which
parts of the system must function.
3.2.2 Scheme 2
Coherent fault trees for sensor readings are also used
in scheme 2. In this case, however, a consistency
check is introduced into the model by including all
sensor readings obtained at any point in the con-
struction of the top event for each scenario. Where
sensor readings are as they should be, they are
included as NOT failed events in the top event struc-
ture. Writing them in their equivalent negated form
now includes sensor readings not considered in
scheme 1, which are true to the normal chosen oper-
ating mode. For example, if the sensor reading for
valve V1 were ‘flow’, then this would be equivalent
to saying that there is ‘NOT no flow’. This therefore
produces a list of working states for flow through
valve V1. The fault trees for a given set of sensor
readings are constructed by combining both the
sensor readings that deviate from that expected,
together with the expected sensor readings in their
equivalent negated form using an AND gate.
Scheme 2 is now demonstrated again assuming
that the sensor readings of scenario 1 are obtained.
Table 6 contains the ACTIVE operating mode for
the system (scenario 4) and scenario 1 with the sen-
sor readings for valves V1 and V2 written in negated
form. Fault trees for these sensor readings can now
be obtained and included in the model together
with those for the deviated sensor readings in order
to check consistency.
The coherent fault trees for the deviated sensor
readings are combined with the consistency checks
as inputs to an AND gate, as shown in Fig. 5.
A qualitative analysis of this fault tree, which is
non-coherent in structure, produces prime impli-
cants [16]. Prime implicants are combinations of
component states (working and failed) that produce
the sensor readings obtained. As only failed compo-
nents need to be considered, the working states are
then removed from the prime implicants to give
the coherent approximation.
The cause of NOT no flow through valve V1 is
P1B:P1F:P2B:S1FH:C1FH:V1FC:NWMS
The cause of NOT no flow through valve V2 is
TR:NWMS:P3B:P3F:P4B:V2FC:P1B:P1F:P2B:S1FH:
C1FH:V1FC
(In the list of component states given above the bar
over the event code means NOT that event.)
These combined (ANDed) together with the
potential causes listed in Table 5 from scheme 1
shows that scheme 2 produces three potential causes
of scenario 1 in the ACTIVE operating mode; these
are listed in Table 7. The potential causes listed
Fig. 4 Top event structure for scenario 1 in the ACTIVE
operating mode containing just deviated sensor
readings
Table 4 ACTIVE operating mode with expected and
actual sensor readings
Scenario V1 V2 V3 TRAY
4 ACTIVE F F NF NW
1 F F F W
Table 5 Potential causes of scenario 1 in the ACTIVE
operating mode using scheme 1
Number Potential cause
1 TL.S2FH
2 TL.C2FH
3 TL.V3FO
4 V1FO.TL.P3B
5 V1FO.TL.P3F
6 V1FO.TL.P4B
7 S1FL.TL.P3B
8 S1FL.TL.P3F
9 S1FL.TL.P4B
10 C1FL.TL.P3B
11 C1FL.TL.P3F
12 C1FL.TL.P4B
13 V1FO.V2FC.TL
14 S1FL.V2FC.TL
15 C1FL.V2FC.TL
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include the working components. Removing these
produces a list of the potential causes containing
only failed components, as shown in Table 7 in the
column headed Coherent approximation. These are
the correct causes of scenario 1. This shows that,
for this particular scenario, scheme 2 is a better
model at pinpointing the actual cause than scheme
1 is. However, scheme 1 showed that coherent fault
trees do not contain sufficient information about
system behaviour to obtain a reliable list of potential
causes. Scheme 2 uses the same fault trees, and so
invalid results from combining the deviated sensor
readings may still occur. NOT logic is introduced
into the fault trees for each sensor reading in
scheme 3 in order to indicate which components
are working.
3.2.3 Scheme 3
In scheme 3, system behaviour is modelled using
non-coherent fault trees. As in scheme 1, the causes
of the sensor readings are given in a fault tree struc-
ture obtained using only the sensor readings that
deviated from the normal system operating mode.
Therefore it does not include a consistency check.
To illustrate scheme 3, the top event structure
(assuming, as before, that the sensor readings repre-
sented by scenario 1 have been obtained) can be
constructed in the same way as for scheme 1 (see
Fig. 4), but using non-coherent fault trees for the
deviated sensor readings.
Analysis of the faults, as in scheme 2, produces
prime implicants. 15 potential causes of scenario 1
are produced by scheme 3. After removing the work-
ing state events, these are the same as those
obtained by scheme 1 which are valid for the
deviated sensor readings (see Table 5). Scheme 3
therefore shows that introducing NOT logic into the
fault trees indicates which components are working
for each deviated sensor reading and removes any
conflicting potential causes.
There are again quite a large number of alterna-
tives and it would be difficult to determine which
could be the actual cause. In the same way as for
scheme 1, scheme 3 does not take into account the
sensor readings from the observation points in the
scenario that are correct for the chosen operating
mode. Some of the potential causes listed in the
example may be invalid. This scheme has failed to
differentiate between the potential causes and so
scheme 4, which contains the additional complexity
of non-coherent sensor deviations with consistency
checks, may provide a better analysis option.
3.2.4 Scheme 4
Scheme 4 modelled system behaviour using non-
coherent fault trees for sensor deviations. The top
event structure for scenario 1 using scheme 4 is
shown in Fig. 5. Analysis of the faults, as in schemes
2 and 3, produces prime implicants. Removing the
working component states gives the coherent approx-
imation. There are three potential causes of
Fig. 5 Top event structure for scenario 1 in the ACTIVE
operating mode containing both deviated sensor
readings and consistency checks
Table 6 ACTIVE operating mode and scenario 1
Scenario V1 V2 V3 TRAY
4 ACTIVE F F NF NW
1 NF NF F W
Table 7 Potential causes of scenario 1 in the ACTIVE operating mode using scheme 2
Number Potential cause Coherent
approximation
1 NWMS:TR:P2B:P1F:P1B:V2FC:TL:P4B:P3B:V1FC:C1FH:S1FH:S2FH TL.S2FH
2 NWMS:TR:P2B:P1F:P1B:V2FC:TL:P4B:P3B:V1FC:C1FH:S1FH:C2FH TL.C2FH
3 NWMS:TR:P2B:P1F:P1B:V2FC:TL:P4B:P3B:V1FC:C1FH:S1FH:V3FO TL.V3FO
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scenario 1, listed in Table 8. The potential causes of
scenario 1 in Table 8 are the same as those obtained
using scheme 2 after removing the working compo-
nents (see Table 7). This shows that schemes 2 and
4 are better models than schemes 1 and 3 at pinpoint-
ing the actual cause of scenario 1. Compared with
the result obtained from scheme 3, the model in
scheme 4 strengthens the belief that not sufficient
information is being obtained by considering only
sensors that have deviated from their expected
readings.
The performances of the four schemes have been
investigated to evaluate their potential causes of all
16 scenarios. Schemes 1 and 2 have both produced
potential causes that are invalid to the top event
structure. For example, for scenario 5, schemes 1
and 2 produce 132 and 111 potential causes respec-
tively for their top event structures. Only 24 of these
results for the two schemes are actually valid even
though the fault trees for the sensor readings are
correct when analysed individually. For certain
scenarios, scheme 2 has also removed potential
causes that are valid to the top event structure. This
implies that there is not sufficient information in
the coherent fault trees to explain the system beha-
viour. Scheme 4 produces the best performance for
both the ACTIVE and the DORMANT operating
modes.
3.3 Switching the system operating modes
The two operating modes for the system are ACTIVE
when the operator opens valve V2, or DORMANT
when V2 is closed. The operating state of the system
can be changed in order to examine the system
behaviour. This can be used alongside any of the
other four schemes previously discussed. Schemes
2 and 4 have both narrowed the potential causes
of scenario 1 in the ACTIVE operating mode down
to three possibilities, (see Table 8). These all
indicate that the tank is definitely leaking (TL) to
create water in the overspill tray, but it is unclear
as to whether sensor S2 has failed high (S2FH), con-
troller C2 has failed high (C2FH), or valve V3 has
failed open (V3FO) in order to cause flow through
valve V3.
If the real cause were, for example, TL.S2FH (the
first potential cause listed in Table 8), one way to
narrow down the possibilities would be to switch
the operating mode of the system, in this case from
ACTIVE to DORMANT. Switching operating modes
could also highlight hidden potential failures for
valve V2. For example, if V2 failed open while the
system was working as in scenario 1 in the ACTIVE
operating mode, then this failure would be masked.
Switching to the DORMANT operating mode would
reveal this failure, which would otherwise have
remained undetected. For scenarios where V2 has
already failed in a given operating mode, switching
modes could conceal this failure. For example, if
there is flow through valves V1 and V2, no flow
through V3, and water in the overspill tray in the
DORMANT operating mode and the system is
switched to the ACTIVE mode, then the failure at
V2 would become hidden.
In the DORMANT mode a different set of sensor
readings resulting from TL.S2FH would occur, which
will be one of two possibilities depending on
whether or not V2 was found to be working correctly.
The sensors in the ACTIVE operating mode indicate
that there is flow through all three valves and water
in the overspill tray. When the operating mode is
switched to DORMANT, there should be no flow
through V2. If this is the case, then the new set of
deviated sensor readings will be no flow through
V2, flow through V1 and V3, and water in the over-
spill tray. If there is still flow through valve V2 after
switching operating modes, then this indicates that
all four sensors have deviated from their normal
operating modes. Treating this set of sensor values
by comparison with the expected set, namely sce-
nario 16 in Table 1, and applying any of the schemes
1 to 4 will produce a set of possible causes. The true
cause of the fault will be in both lists. Valve V2 failing
if not apparent before switching modes will be indi-
cated by the addition of this component failure to
the potential causes in the list from the mode that
the system has been switched to.
4 DISCUSSION
4.1 Effectiveness of the schemes
Schemes 1 to 4 were applied to the 16 scenarios of
possible sensor readings listed in Table 1. An index
has been applied to each of the schemes to give
some indication of their relative merits. For each
scheme the number of possible causes indicated is
reported, together with how many of the correct
causes are included in this list.
An index to indicate the effectiveness of the
scheme is calculated using the ratio of the number
of valid causes to the total number of potential
causes and averaged over the scenarios. The index
Table 8 Potential causes of scenario 1 in the ACTIVE
operating mode using scheme 4
Number Potential causes
1 TL.S2FH
2 TL.C2FH
3 TL.V3FO
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is used on each scheme to indicate how effective it
has been at obtaining correct potential causes of fail-
ure over the 15 scenarios that contain at least one
deviated sensor reading (one of the scenarios repre-
sents the symptoms of a fully functioning system).
4.1.1 Definition of effectiveness index
The effectiveness index IE used is defined as
IE ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1
nci
ni
where
N ¼ number of scenarios investigated
ni ¼ number of potential causes of failure identi-
fied by the scheme for scenario i
nci ¼ number of correct potential causes of failure
obtained by the scheme for scenario i
4.1.2 Results
The DORMANTmode is the less interesting situation
for the tank system and so the discussion is focused
on the ACTIVE system operation. Results obtained
for schemes 1 to 4 in the ACTIVE operating
mode and their respective effectiveness indices are
shown in Table 9. For each scheme and each
scenario the table contains the number of possible
causes produced by the scheme and the number of
these that are correct causes of the symptoms
observed. The actual number of causes that would
have been produced if the scheme gave a perfectly
correct list is indicated in the final column of
the table.
The validity of any potential cause of the observed
symptoms has been checked regarding its imme-
diate effects on the system. Situations are not
considered where the symptoms change in time,
e.g. longer term if the water level is increasing and
the safety valve V3 opens; there is initially no flow
through V3 which changes when the valve opens.
Dynamic effects are not investigated here. The effec-
tiveness index is given for each scheme.
Schemes 1 and 2 have both produced potential
causes that are invalid to the top event structure,
even though the fault trees for the sensor readings
are correct when analysed individually. This implies
that coherent fault trees do not contain sufficient
information about the system to produce an accu-
rate list of potential causes. When the working states
are considered as in scheme 2, the effectiveness is
improved, as indicated by the index increasing
from 0.296 to 0.750. Scheme 4 uses non-coherent
fault trees and information from all sensors; there-
fore the causes obtained are more accurate than
those obtained by schemes 1 to 3 and this is reflected
in the IE result.
4.2 Scalability and consistency checks
The methods presented in this paper for diagnosing
faults in systems using FTA to explain the deviations
from normal values observed in the sensed variables
have been illustrated using a simple example
containing only a small number of components.
Application to a larger system is required in order
to show how effective the methods would be when
used on real systems.
The computational expense from a large number
of sensors is the main problem. Introducing consis-
tency checks may be prohibitive for real-time analy-
sis of industrial systems. Scheme 4 could be heavy
on computer processing power, but scheme 3 is not
as reliable because it does not check consistency.
Table 9 Results obtained for schemes 1 to 4 in the ACTIVE operating mode and effectiveness index
Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 Number of actual
Scenario V1 V2 V3 TRAY ni nci ni nci ni nci ni nci possibilities
1 F F F W 102 3 3 3 15 3 3 3 3
2 F F F NW 15 3 3 3 15 3 3 3 3
3 F F NF W 74 1 1 1 74 1 1 1 1
4 F F NF NW – – – – – – – – –
5 F NF F W 132 24 111 24 45 24 24 24 24
6 F NF F NW 48 24 24 24 45 24 24 24 24
7 F NF NF W 84 77 77 77 84 77 77 77 77
8 F NF NF NW 12 4 4 4 12 4 4 4 4
9 NF F F W 714 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
10 NF F F NW 105 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
11 NF F NF W 518 7 7 7 14 7 7 7 7
12 NF F NF NW 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
13 NF NF F W 714 0 714 0 21 0 21 0 84
14 NF NF F NW 105 0 105 0 21 0 21 0 84
15 NF NF NF W 518 14 518 14 14 14 14 14 14
16 NF NF NF NW 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Effectiveness index IE 0.296 0.750 0.549 0.867
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However, this can be solved by taking the potential
causes obtained from just the deviated sensor read-
ings and checking these individually against those
from the sensor readings which are true to the oper-
ating mode. Any potential causes that lead to a con-
tradiction can then be removed from the list.
4.3 Imperfect sensors
The method illustrated in this paper has been
applied to an example that does not account for
the possibility that there are imperfect sensors in
the system. The example used demonstrates the
approach taken to fault detection. It could accom-
modate sensor failures by incorporating these events
into the fault trees for each sensor reading and the
analysis performed in the same way.
4.4 Obtaining the exact cause of failure
Ideally the most efficient scheme to model the beha-
viour of a system would be one that could determine
the exact cause of each scenario. However, in reality
there may be more than one possible cause. For
example, there are three potential causes of scenario
1 in the ACTIVE operating mode (see Table 8). These
all indicate that the tank is definitely leaking (TL) to
create water in the overspill tray, but it is unclear as
to whether sensor S2 has failed high (S2FH), control-
ler C2 has failed high (C2FH), or valve V3 has failed
open (V3FO) in order to cause flow through valve V3.
Valve V3 can fail in three different ways that would
still produce the same outcome for the top event
structure. Switching the operating mode in this
case does not reduce the number of potential causes
but could highlight whether there is a problem at
valve V2. Therefore, a probability for each compo-
nent would have to be introduced in order to deduce
which is most likely to have caused the scenario.
This addition to the calculation procedure would
effectively be providing measures [13] for each mini-
mal cut set.
4.5 Dynamic effects
At present the water tank system is observed in a
steady state. Because of this it is not possible, with-
out taking into account transient effects, for some
of the 16 scenarios to occur. For example there are
scenarios containing a ‘no flow’ sensor reading for
valve V1 and flow through at least one of the other
two valves produced no potential causes, indicating
that they could never happen. However, if dynamics
were taken into consideration, then depending on
the state of the system these scenarios may occur,
albeit for a short period of time. Therefore consider-
ing the effects of dynamics on the water tank
would provide a more realistic model of the system
behaviour.
4.6 Two-phase system
The water tank system is assumed to be in one of two
phases, these being the flow phase through valve V2
when in the ACTIVE operating mode and the no-flow
phase through V2 in the DORMANT operating mode.
However, V2 could be partially open, indicating an
intermediate flow phase through the valve. Further
analysis could therefore consider the behaviour of
the system when failure modes are not clear.
5 CONCLUSIONS
1. FTA can be used to identify multiple faults in a
systems fault diagnostic capability.
2. Non-coherent fault trees to represent the causes
of sensor outputs provide more reliable results
than those obtained using coherent fault trees.
3. The introduction of consistency checks with the
information provided by all sensors is required
in order to produce an accurate list of all potential
causes of the current system state.
4. Scheme 4, which uses non-coherent fault trees
and checks for consistency by using information
from all the observation points, is the most accu-
rate of schemes 1 to 4 for modelling the behaviour
of the water tank system.
5. Switching the operating mode of the system can
be used alongside scheme 4 to produce a more
precise list of potential causes should the system
function enable mode switching.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The research reported in this paper has been carried
out with financial support from BAE Systems.
REFERENCES
1 Zuzek, A., Biasizzo, A., and Novak, F. Towards a gen-
eral test presentation in the test sequencing problem.
In Proceedings of the Second International On-Line
Testing Workshop, (New York). IEEE Computer Society
Press, Biarritz, France, 1996, pp. 236–237.
2 Zuzek, A., Novak, F., Biasizzo, A., Savnik, I., and
Cestnik, B. Sequential diagnosis tool for system
maintenance and repair. Electrotech. Rev., 1995, 62
224–231.
3 Biasizzo, A., Zuzek, A., and Novak, F. Sequential diag-
nosis tool. Microprocessors Microsystems, 2000, 24
191–197.
54 E E Hurdle, L M Bartlett, and J D Andrews
Proc. IMechE Vol. 221 Part O: J. Risk and Reliability JRR6  IMechE 2007
4 Biasizzo, A., Zuzek, A., and Novak, F. Sequential diag-
nosis with asymmetrical tests. Computer J., 1998, 41(3)
163–170.
5 Pattipati, K. R. and Alexandridis, M. G. Application of
heuristic search and information theory to sequential
fault diagnosis. IEEE Trans. Systems, Man, Cybernetics,
1990, 20(4), 872–887.
6 Shakeri, M., Raghavan, V., Pattipati, K. R., and
Patterson-Hine, A. Sequential testing algorithms for
multiple fault diagnosis. IEEE Trans. Systems, Man,
Cybernetics, Part A: Systems Humans, 2000, 30(1) 1–14.
7 Rao, N. S. V. Expected-value analysis of two single fault
diagnosis algorithms. IEEE Trans. Computers, 1993,
42(3) 272–280.
8 Pattipati, K. R. Computationally efficient algorithms
for multiple fault diagnosis in large graph-based
systems. IEEE Trans. System, Man, Cybernetics, Part A:
Systems Humans, 2003, 33(1), 73–85.
9 Price, C. Computer-based diagnostic systems, 1999
(Springer-Verlag, London).
10 Paasch, R. and Mocko, G. Incorporating uncertainty
in diagnostic analysis of mechanical systems.
Trans. ASME, J. Mech. Design, 2005, 217(2),
315–325.
11 Papadopoulos, Y. Model-based system monitoring
and diagnosis of failures using statecharts and fault
trees. Int. J. Reliability Engng System Safety, 2003, 81
325–341.
12 Zhou Yangping, Zhoo Bingquan, and Wu Dong Xiu
Application of genetic algorithms to fault diagnosis in
nuclear power plants. Reliability Engng System Safety,
2000, 67, 153–160.
13 Andrews, J. D. and Moss, T. R. Reliability and
risk assessment, 2nd edition, 2002 (Professional
Engineering Publishing Limited, Bury St Edmunds
and London).
14 Lee, W. S., Grosh, D. L., Tillman, F. A., and Lie, C. H.
Fault tree analysis methods and applications – a
review. IEEE Trans. Reliability, 1985, 34(3) 194–203.
15 Billinton, R. and Allan R. N. Reliability evaluation
of engineering systems, 2nd edition, 1992 (Plenum,
New York).
16 Andrews, J. D. The use of NOT logic in fault tree analy-
sis. Quality Reliability Engng Int., 2001, 17, 143–150.
System fault diagnostics using fault tree analysis 55
JRR6  IMechE 2007 Proc. IMechE Vol. 221 Part O: J. Risk and Reliability
